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Abstract  
Economics has tended to neglect giving, and thus both its important contemporary economic role 
and its potential contribution to alternative, non-market systems. To remedy this, it will need to 
draw on the broad debates on the nature of the gift that have developed in and across the other 
social sciences. This paper addresses several of these by asking how we should define the terms gift 
and giving. It rejects definitional associations of giving with obligation, reciprocity and the 
development of social relationships. Such definitions exclude many phenomena commonly 
understood as giving and underpin misguided attempts to analyse gifts in contemporary late-
modern societies in terms derived from anthropological discussions of very different societies. 
Instead, the paper develops a definition of the gift based on contemporary giving institutions. A 
more open, contemporary definition of the gift helps to sensitise us to the continuing importance of 
gift institutions in social and economic life. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have systematically neglected the institutionalised practices of the gift. As Gibson-
Graham show, both mainstream and Marxist approaches tend to identify the contemporary 
economy with the market, or at best the market plus the state, while ignoring the many other forms 
that we employ to meet our material needs (Gibson-Graham, 2006). More positively, institutional, 
realist, social and feminist economists have begun to analyse the provisioning economy as a 
progressive alternative to the market (Elder-Vass, 2016, pp. 22–41; Gruchy, 1987; Nelson, 1993; 
Power, 2004; Sayer, 2004). Even here, though, there has been little consideration of the central role 
of giving practices in provisioning. There are many reasons for this but this paper focuses on one 
issue that is both a contributory factor and a symptom of this neglect: the inadequacy of prevailing 
definitions of giving and the gift in the social sciences. This paper aims to improve and clarify our 
definition of the gift, as one small step towards encouraging greater interest in gift practices 
amongst economists. 
In the rare cases where mainstream economists have considered giving they have tended to treat it, 
first, as nothing more than the exchange of presents purchased in the market, and second, as just 
one more arena for the individualistic maximisation of self-interest. Perhaps the classic treatment is 
Waldfogel’s revealingly titled paper ‘The Deadweight Loss of Christmas’ (Waldfogel, 1993). 
Waldfogel’s central argument is that giving purchased gifts rather than cash gifts is utility-destroying, 
because if the recipient received cash instead she could usually buy something that she would prefer 
to the gift chosen by the giver. Waldfogel seems oblivious to the emotional meanings of the 
institution of giving presents – the fact that a recipient might value something more because a friend 
had bought it for her, for example, in a context where giving gifts is an institutionalised practice for 
signalling care and commitment. 
Unfortunately heterodox treatments of giving are almost as rare, and not always more helpful. Fine, 
for example, devotes an entire chapter to dismissing “the gift/commodity duality (and the gift itself 
other than as heuristic device)” (Fine, 2002, p. 27), arguing that gift relations can only be understood 
by analysing capitalist commodity production, thus subordinating giving practices to his real 
interests (e.g. Fine, 2002, p. 26). Boulding is one of the few heterodox economists to have taken the 
gift seriously, in his work on the grants economy, although his concept of grants combines gifts with 
payments from the state and his style tends more towards mathematical formalisation than 
institutional analysis (Boulding, 1973). More recently, Mirowski has launched a typically penetrating 
and entertaining attack on both neoclassical and anthropological theories of the gift, but continues 
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to see gift practices as a kind of exchange that must be assessed in terms of a theory of value, 
whereas gifts are at least sometimes one-way transfers rather than exchanges (Mirowski, 2001). 
If economics is to move beyond this neglect, it needs to draw on the other social sciences. Here 
debates on the gift have been strongly shaped by Marcel Mauss’s iconic book The Gift (Essai sur le 
Don) (Mauss, 2002), but in recent years doubts have been raised about the applicability of Maussian 
understandings of the gift – which were largely based on anthropological studies – to contemporary 
cases. A related consequence is that restrictive understandings of giving derived (arguably 
incorrectly) from Mauss’s work have helped to obscure the continuing importance of gift institutions 
in social and economic life, and their potentially important role in alternative economic futures 
(Benkler, 2006, 2013; Elder-Vass, 2014b, 2016). 
Section 2 begins the argument by making the case for definitions in general, and concepts of giving 
and the gift in particular, that reflect lay understandings – in this case lay understandings of 
contemporary gift practices. Section 3 engages with the Maussian tradition and criticises influential 
definitions of the gift associated with it that conflict with this approach to definition. Finally, Section 
4 advances and justifies a definition of the gift that takes account of the issues raised in the previous 
sections – a definition that encourages the study of a much wider range of institutions than has been 
common in the gift literature. 
2. How should we define our terms? 
 To be understood and to be persuasive scholars must be clear about what words mean when we 
use them (Hodgson, 2019, p. 1). While we can mostly rely on a shared linguistic background with our 
readers, part of the task of the theorist is to expand our understandings beyond, and sometimes in 
opposition to, lay beliefs. Sometimes this entails using words in ways that may not match the 
linguistic backgrounds of most readers. This need not create difficulty: all specialisms employ their 
own vocabularies, the terms of which may be quite clearly understood by their users. The social 
sciences, however, face a more challenging problem because our terms relate to everyday social 
phenomena that are both described by terms in common use and influenced by our use of those 
terms; indeed institutionalised practices such as gift giving are governed through the words we use 
to delineate and endorse them. If we are to speak of these phenomena it is natural to feel that we 
should do so “as much as possible in familiar everyday language... that is widely accessible to non-
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specialists” (Riggs, 1993, p. 195)1F2 and yet this raises the thorny question of the relation between the 
everyday and the theoretical meanings of the same term. 
Consider, for example, the following definition of the gift: “Any exchange of goods and services with 
no guarantee of recompense in order to create, nourish, or recreate social bonds between people” 
(Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 20). Here, the role of the phrase “in order to create, nourish, or recreate 
social bonds between people” is to build an element of theory into the definition, with the effect of 
excluding those transfers of goods and services that do not nourish social bonds. But as Hodgson has 
argued, building theory into definitions can generate disagreement and impair understanding ( 
Hodgson, 2019, pp. 9, 13), in this case because there is no such exclusion from the everyday concept 
of the gift: an anonymous gift to an animal welfare charity, for example, is still a gift according to 
common English usage but it may make no significant contribution to nourishing social bonds, and 
the donor may have no intention that it should (cf Laidlaw, 2002, p. 49). 
We can understand this definitional issue in terms of the relation between stipulative, descriptive (or 
lexical), and explicative definitions. A stipulative definition “imparts a meaning to the defined term, 
and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term” 
(Gupta, 2014, section 1.3); a descriptive or lexical definition, by contrast, aims to describe the 
existing usage of a term; and an explicative definition “aims to respect some central uses of a term 
but is stipulative on others” (Gupta, 2014, section 1.5). Godbout and Caillé’s definition is an 
explicative one: it respects the basic everyday sense of the gift as something that is transferred “with 
no guarantee of recompense” but also seeks to be stipulative about a different aspect of the gift: 
that it must nourish social bonds. 
Such interference with generally accepted understandings of a term is risky. An author might make 
some claim about gifts, for example, meaning it only to apply to that subset of gifts stipulated in her 
explicative definition, but be read as meaning it to apply to all gifts, as commonly understood, 
generating unnecessary criticism and conflict. As Riggs puts it, “the author’s stipulated meaning may 
[easily be] lost while readers struggle vainly to make sense out of a text in which well-known words 
do not carry their normal connotations” (Riggs, 1993, p. 196) (and see Gerring, 1999, p. 361; G.M. 
Hodgson, 2019, p. 5). 
Although this is a good argument for respecting common usage in our definitions, uncritically 
accepting descriptive definitions of terms that are to be used for theoretical purposes can also cause 
problems. One set of problems arises from the widespread polysemia of everyday words (Gerring & 
                                                          
2 Hodgson cites an impressive array of thinkers to support this point, including Aristotle, Malthus and Marshall 
( Hodgson, 2019, p. 4). 
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Barresi, 2009, p. 243). The same word, that is, may have multiple meanings. If, for example, we look 
up the verb ‘give’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, we find no less than twenty-three different 
meanings, some of which have up to four variations (Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 417). The 
social study of giving is concerned with one of these senses or perhaps one group of them, in which, 
to put it simply “To give, is to hand over something to somebody free of charge” (Testart, 1998, p. 
97). Yet some of the dictionary meanings are quite unrelated to this, such as “utter (gave a shriek)”, 
or even diametrically opposed, notably “make over in exchange or payment (gave him £30 for the 
bicycle)” (Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 417). While we may use the same word to express these 
various meanings, these are not all the same concept, and we must clearly exclude them from the 
study of giving in the sense of handing things over free of charge. For these purposes at least, a fully 
descriptive definition of giving is thoroughly inappropriate.2F3 As Hodgson puts it “in these 
circumstances, reliance on lexical appeals is problematic and some stipulation is unavoidable” ( 
Hodgson, 2019, p. 5). In the case of giving, then, we will need an explicative definition, one that 
excludes all these other senses so that we can focus on one concept, referring to a specific set of 
social practices or institutions, those in which things are handed over free of charge. 
Perhaps this is one reason why scholars have often spoken not of giving but of the gift. Superficially, 
these two words appear equivalent in the sense that they are merely the verb and noun forms used 
to speak about the same phenomenon: when one gives, at least in the sense of handing things over 
free of charge, what one gives is a gift, and a gift is something that is given. Perhaps the two words 
were once related only in this way, but today they are  not. When one gives a shriek, what is given is 
not a gift. When one gives £30 in payment for a bicycle, what is given is not a gift.  
One might therefore try to avoid the polysemic meanings of giving by adopting gift as the theoretical 
term instead. However, although the range of meanings attached to gift is smaller, it still does not 
converge precisely on the practices that interest social theorists of the gift. The most obvious 
exception is the sense of gift as referring to “a natural ability or talent” (Oxford University Press, 
1996, p. 416). Once it was widely believed that natural abilities were given by God. Few of us now 
accept this, yet we continue to refer to such abilities as gifts. Talent is not given, yet we call it a gift. 
So even if we were to adopt gift as a term instead of giving, we would still need to define it 
explicatively, excluding the case of natural talents.3F4  
There seems no viable alternative, then, but to use explicative definitions for the central theoretical 
terms in the study of giving. This does not mean that we can never adopt terms that refer to more 
                                                          
3 Different languages may also have different polysemic ranges of apparently similar words. 
4 Or at least we should: Hyde’s work on the gift in art deliberately conflates both concepts into a single “gift-
sphere” as if talent and giving were just two different forms of one unitary phenomenon (Hyde, 2013). 
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restricted ranges of meaning: my objection is to using everyday terms in this way. There is a simple 
technique we may use to generate more restricted concepts: the qualified term. Thus, for example, 
Godbout and Caillé may wish to work with a concept that refers only to those gifts that nourish 
social bonds. Rather than redefining gift to mean this, they could stipulatively define a qualified 
term, such as bonding gift, to represent this concept. This has the merit of engaging the reader’s 
understanding of the common meaning of gift while signposting that we are using a restricted 
version of the concept and indicating the nature of that restriction. This technique is also useful for 
distinguishing between different kinds of giving. Any plausible definition of the gift must respect 
what Silber has called “the astonishing variety and multiplicity of forms and functions of gift-giving” 
(Silber, 1998, p. 146). We will therefore need terms that distinguish different kinds of gifts within the 
larger class of gifts-in-general, even when that larger class has already been explicatively bounded.  
3. Maussian definitions of the gift 
As Mirowski has said, “all roads to the gift lead back to Marcel Mauss” (Mirowski, 2001, p. 438). 
Mauss’s analysis of the gift, based on anthropological evidence, was intended as a critique of 
utilitarianism, showing how societies could be integrated and coordinated through non-market 
forms of economy. While some of his followers have focussed on developing this critique of 
utilitarianism, the Maussian tradition is diverse, and others have sought to apply his analysis of 
giving practices to a wider or even universal range of societies. Mauss himself never defines the gift 
(Testart, 1998, p. 97), but he constantly ties it to three features: reciprocation, to an obligation to 
give, and to the maintenance of social relations. At least the first two of these refer to “systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” and thus to institutions ( 
Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). Although his own argument was founded on anthropological examples, some 
of his interpreters have concluded that these theoretical claims are definitional of gifts in general – 
including contemporary gifts – and thus failed to recognise that institutions are particular to specific 
communities ( Hodgson, 2006, p. 3).4F5 While giving persists in the contemporary world, the forms of 
its institutions are not the same as those discussed by Mauss. Let us consider the three features 
highlighted by Mauss in turn. 
First, Mauss constantly stresses the “obligation to reciprocate”, indeed the phrase appears in the 
title of the first chapter of his book (Mauss, 2002, p. 10). In Mauss, however, this is a phrase that is 
always connected to particular societies, to particular practices (e.g. the potlatch: Mauss, 2002, pp. 
                                                          
5 The issue is further complicated by language. As Sandy Ross has pointed out to me, Mauss uses the semi-
archaic words don and prestation (which has connotations of loan and service as well as gift) rather than 
cadeau, and so to refer to his work as a theory of the gift may be a mistranslation. Yet the Anglophone gift 
literature builds its theories on this basis. 
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11, 53), or at most to groups of societies sharing a similar institutional context (Mauss, 2002, p. 23). 
Though he extends his analysis rather vaguely to contemporary society in his closing chapter, he 
never says explicitly that all gifts everywhere necessarily involve an obligation to reciprocate. Yet, 
influenced by Mauss, Gregory for example has argued that “reciprocity, along with the inalienation 
and the obligation to return it implies, is the defining characteristic of a gift” (Gregory, 1997, p. 65). 
Though various thinkers have sought to make this true by redefining reciprocity to cover a wider and 
wider range of referents, in doing so they have taken this term far beyond the corresponding 
common usage. As Graeber says, “if one has already decided that all relations are based on 
reciprocity, one can always define the term so broadly as to make it true” (Graeber, 2011, p. 405). 
But in doing so writers not only take the concept of reciprocity beyond the range of ordinary 
understandings, they also deprive Mauss’s argument of its original meaning. Mauss’s point is that 
gifts result in an equivalent or superior return to the original giver (though sometimes after a cycle 
of intermediate transfers). But to preserve the idea that gifts must be reciprocated, reciprocity has 
been redefined to include, for example, what Sahlins calls “generalized reciprocity” (Sahlins, 1974, p. 
199):an institution in which a gift from A to B must lead to a gift from B to C, but without any 
necessity that the circuit will continue until A receives a return (cf Moody, 2008). Once reciprocity is 
redefined in this way the claim that gifts must be reciprocated no longer corresponds with Mauss’s 
original argument.  
Furthermore Mauss’s original argument, if it is to be read as meaning that all gifts must be 
reciprocated in something like the normal everyday sense (as it is, for example, in Douglas, 2002), is 
“manifestly false” (Testart, 1998, p. 98) (also see Elder-Vass, 2015). The examples of unreciprocated 
gift institutions can be multiplied endlessly: presents to children (Cheal, 1988, pp. 8, 57; Godbout & 
Caillé, 1998, pp. 24, 41), blood donation (Silber, 1998, p. 138; Titmuss, 1997) , organ donation (Healy, 
2006), gifts to beggars (Testart, 1998, p. 98), gifts to charities and political causes (Lainer-Vos, 2013, 
p. 30), and the various forms of the Indian institution of dan (Laidlaw, 2002; Parry, 1986), for 
example.5F6 Even when return gifts actually do occur, this does not necessarily mean that it makes 
sense to understand them as obligatory reciprocation, as indeed other Maussians have pointed out 
(Godbout, 2000, pp. 30, 40; Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 95).  
Mauss also stresses the obligation to give, again in the context of specific types of society (Mauss, 
2002, pp. 16–17). But Carrier, for example, generalises this into a fundamental distinction between 
gifts and commodities: “From the Maussian perspective… gift transactions are obligatory: the parties 
are obligated to give, receive and repay. On the other hand, commodity transactions are voluntary” 
                                                          
6 For a similar list see (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, pp. 92–93). 
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(Carrier, 1995, p. 11).  When he goes on to define gifts, again invoking Mauss, he insists that “gift 
exchange is (1) the obligatory transfer of (2) inalienable objects or services between (3) mutually 
obligated and related transactors” (Carrier, 1995, p. 21). All three elements of Carrier’s definition are 
problematic, but here I focus only on the first: What could it mean to say that a transfer is 
obligatory?  
Testart, in a brilliant analysis of concepts of obligation employed in the Maussian tradition, argues 
that it covers a broad range of degrees of obligatoriness. At the weakest end of the scale, there are 
gifts that involve no obligation whatsoever, either to give or to reciprocate, as for example when one 
gives a coin to a beggar (Testart, 1998, p. 98). If someone invites me to dinner, I may feel obliged to 
return the invitation at some point, but “there is no sanction attached to this ‘obligation to 
reciprocate’, which is merely a feeling” (Testart, 1998, p. 99). The sense of obligation to return the 
Native American potlatch was rather stronger (although only for some of its recipients) in that failure 
could lead to some loss of prestige, but there was no sanction exercisable against such failure 
(Testart, 1998, pp. 99–101). The Trobriand Islands institution of kula by contrast explicitly allowed 
someone who was entitled to a certain type of object from a certain person to seize it if it was not 
given, and in such cases we can say that reciprocation truly is obligatory, although there was no 
sanction against a defaulter who did not possess the required object, and Testart questions whether 
gift is really an appropriate term here: perhaps this is more a loan than a gift (Testart, 1998, pp. 101–
102). There are even stronger senses of obligation attached to modern debts, in that bailiffs can 
break into our houses and take anything they can find to the value of the debt, but enforceable 
modern debts are neither gifts nor required reciprocations of gifts (Testart, 1998, p. 102). Clearly, 
obligations to give and reciprocate vary considerably between institutional contexts, may be rather 
weaker than many other social obligations, and sometimes do not exist at all. Tying our definition of 
the gift to obligation thus excludes many good examples of gifts but it also draws in cases that 
common usage might exclude.  
The Maussian theoretical claim that has been most widely adopted into definitions of the gift, 
however, is the idea that gifts are necessarily moves in developing or sustaining social relationships. 
We have seen this already in Godbout and Caillé’s definition: “Any exchange of goods and services 
with no guarantee of recompense in order to create, nourish, or recreate social bonds between 
people is a gift” (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 20). Similarly Douglas argues that “A gift that does 
nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction” (Douglas, 2002, p. x). And Caillé gives an interesting 
double definition:  
  Page 9 
1) A sociological definition: every allowance of goods and services made without a guarantee 
of return, with a view to creating, maintaining or regenerating the social bond. In the 
relationship of the gift, the bond is more important than the good. 2) A general definition: 
every action or allowance made without expectation, guarantee or certainty of return, and 
which, because of this fact, has a dimension of ‘gratuity’ (Caillé, 2000, p. 47)  
Caillé’s sociological definition reiterates the definitional link to social relations. As we have seen, this 
link cannot stand if our concept of the gift is to correspond to any sense of the term in common 
usage, since there are significant cases of the gift that do not make any direct contributions to 
nourishing social bonds, such as certain gifts to charity, and some of the many gifts that occur over 
the Internet (Elder-Vass, 2014a). If I share the MP3 file for a song over a peer to peer service, for 
example, it may be anonymously downloaded by people who neither know nor care that I 
contributed part of their download. While they may feel a general sense of community with other 
users there is no one-to-one relationship building (Giesler, 2006). Caillé’s second definition is far 
closer to the core common usage but using the same term for both seems destined to create 
confusion: when Caillé goes on to talk of the gift later in the paper, how are we to know which of 
these definitions is intended? Nor is it clear whether Caillé recognises that these two definitions of 
the gift have different extensions (i.e. they describe different though overlapping sets of 
phenomena), or whether he believes that he can tie the extension of the general definition to the 
theoretical claims in his sociological definition. It would be far clearer to use his two definitions to 
define two separate terms, such as bonding gift and gift. Stripped of this definitional confusion, we 
could then make use of these to address the interesting and important question of when, how, and 
how widely gifts play the potentially crucial social role of nourishing bonds between people: the 
question, in other words, of which gifts are bonding gifts (cf. Gudeman, 2001, pp. 460–461). 
Although Mauss himself does not explicitly draw reciprocity, obligation and social bonding into a 
definition of the gift, his work has contributed to the belief that the social sciences should operate 
with a concept of the gift that is disconnected from common contemporary understandings. Mauss 
constructs his argument by lifting the concept of the gift from a modern context and applying it to a 
range of practices in quite different societies. He achieves an impact on his readers by playing on 
their supposedly naïve assumptions about the nature of the gift and counterposing the reality of 
non-modern ‘gift’ practices to those assumptions (Laidlaw, 2002, p. 57). The gift, we are to 
understand, is not voluntary but obligatory, not altruistic but designed to generate a return, and not 
an individualist act but a compulsory act of constructing social solidarity. A strange inversion has 
been performed here: the term gift has been uprooted from a modern context, applied to a number 
of practices that in some cases at least do not conform with the mainstream modern concept of the 
gift, then Mauss and his followers seek to generalise from this particular mix of practices to a 
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universal theory of the gift (Danby, 2002, p. 21; Silber, 1998, p. 137), while ignoring the modern 
giving practices from which the term was first drawn and criticising views of the gift that reflect 
those practices. Some of them, as we have seen, even go so far as to define the gift in ways that are 
derived from non-modern practices while neglecting modern ones.  
Mauss himself writes perceptively about a range of important practices, he universalises less, and 
more tentatively, than some of those who have been influenced by his work, and he performs the 
enormous service of showing us that economies can operate on other models than the market one. 
But to insist, as some other scholars have done, on defining the contemporary gift in the terms he 
employs in his anthropological analyses excludes a vast range of actual gifts, of things handed over 
free of charge, from the scope of theories of giving. 
4. A new definition of the gift 
How, then, should we define the gift? Every significant word in a good definition performs a 
boundary function: it includes some cases within the extension of the term being defined, and 
excludes others. I suggest that a good definition should tend to include cases understood as giving in 
common usage, and to exclude cases that are not, though consistency of meaning is also important. 
There will, however, be difficult cases that remind us that the boundaries of reference of a term are 
often, and perhaps inevitably, vague ( Hodgson, 2019, p. 2).  
I propose, then, to define a gift as a voluntary transfer of goods or services from one party (the 
donor) to another (the recipient) that does not require a compulsory transfer in return, and giving as 
the process of voluntarily transferring goods or services to another party without any requirement for 
a compulsory transfer in return. Let us consider each of the significant terms in turn. 
First, the gift is voluntary. It is a transfer that is not compelled by law, threat, or expected sanction. 
This contradicts the Maussian view of gifts criticised in the previous section. Gifts may be expected in 
certain circumstances: I am normatively expected, for example, to give a card and a present to 
various members of my family on their birthdays, but there is no compulsion for me to do so.  
Still, there is a grey area at this boundary: institutions are generated and sustained by a mix of 
endorsement and enforcement that varies across a range of degrees of sanction. Some may be so 
strongly enforced that they border on being compulsory. In a society, for example, where women 
are expected to do all domestic and caring work for their partners and children it may sometimes be 
problematic whether this is a voluntary act and thus a gift. Perhaps some women enter such 
relationships voluntarily, and are happy to perform this role. Others may be under stronger 
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compulsion, in the most extreme cases from domestic violence, and in such cases their work in the 
house must be regarded as forced labour rather than a gift. 
One implication is that the payment of taxes is not generally a gift. Paying taxes is compelled by law 
and thus, as Godbout puts it, taxes are “the exact opposite of a gift – a gift that’s imposed is not a 
gift” (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 60). Similarly, the benefits conferred by the welfare state are not a 
gift, for a similar reason: once the processes of political debate, power struggle, and legislation have 
led to the creation of a given form of benefit, the state is legally obliged to deliver it to those who 
qualify for it. As Zelizer puts it, these benefits are not gifts but entitlements (1996). One implication 
is that gifts are only one variety of what Boulding calls grants – there are types of one way transfer 
that are not gifts (Boulding, 1973).  
The element of voluntariness also implies that whether something is a gift depends on the intention 
of the donor. Mirowski illustrates the issue nicely with the case of the dropped banknote: if I 
unknowingly drop a banknote and someone picks it up, that is not a gift: “the gift must have an 
intentional aspect to be a gift” (Mirowski, 2001, p. 447). This intentional aspect may however be 
rather minimal: the donor must intend that the good or service be transferred to some recipient 
without a return being required, but need not intend that it be seen as a gift, nor intend for example 
that a particular party be the recipient. Thus, for example, the MP3 file posted by the BitTorrent user 
is a gift, but a gift to unknown recipients. 
Second, the gift is a transfer, but what is transferred when we make a gift is not so much a thing as a 
right to a benefit or set of benefits. I may pass you my mobile phone to show you a message I have 
received, but in doing so I have not given you my mobile phone, because I have not transferred any 
rights: as the legal property owner I have the right to control who has physical possession of my 
phone and the right to control who sees my messages and I have simply exercised those rights in 
authorising you to hold my phone and look at a message ( Hodgson, 2015). If I were to give you a 
mobile phone, I would be transferring a bundle of rights over that phone to you and relinquishing a 
bundle of rights of my own in the process. One way of putting this point is to say that “To be given as 
a gift an object must be alienable, in the dual sense that the donor has the right to renounce 
ownership of it and that the recipient has the right to possess it as his or her own property” (Cheal, 
1988, p. 10).  
Gifts of services are somewhat different. If someone, for example, mows the lawn of an elderly 
neighbour without any expectation of reward, they have given the neighbour a service. What is 
transferred is not an alienable object, but rather the product of the donor’s labour: in this case, the 
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transformation of the lawn to a tidier state. The donor has not transferred rights over something but 
rather improved something over which the recipient already held rights. Gifts of labour also raise the 
question of power: when young people take unpaid internships, for example, they give a gift of 
labour to an employer whose control over access to work creates the context in which internships 
become necessary to those pursuing certain sorts of careers. 
Third, what is transferred is goods or services. The previous paragraphs explained both, but what of 
the exclusions implicit in this formulation? Can things be given that are neither goods nor services? 
Adloff and Mau, for example, argue that “people are permanently giving each other non-tangible 
‘things’ in everyday face-to-face situations” (Adloff & Mau, 2006, p. 110): interactional ‘gifts’ of 
attention, interest, concern, support, responsiveness, and the like (cf Martelaere, 2000, p. 214). 
Godbout and Caillé even speak of the words we use in conversation as “given and returned” and if 
we define the gift this widely, it becomes “the basis for a system, a system that is nothing less than 
the social system as a whole” (Godbout & Caillé, 1998, p. 13). Donati goes even further when he says 
that every relationship depends upon a gift, our willingness to “recognize the Other as having 
dignity, give your trust and put yourself in his/her place” (Donati, 2003, p. 269). Trusting or 
respecting others seems to count as a gift for Donati, even before it leads to communicative 
interaction. These are somewhat imperialistic understandings of the gift, which risk turning 
everything we do into a gift and thus rob the concept of its specificity. I doubt that we should count 
interactions as gifts, though this raises a challenging question. Perhaps some of the things that are 
sold as services provide primarily interactional benefits, and if such services can be sold, could they 
also be given? But in common usage, smiles and supportive comments are not generally considered 
gifts, and although one might say that A gave B a supportive comment, I take it that here give is 
being used in one of its other polysemic senses rather than the core sense we are concerned with 
here. Perhaps the argument that a gift is a transfer of a right to a benefit is enough to distinguish 
between interactions and services that can reasonably be considered gifts, but this issue requires 
more attention than I can give it here. 
Fourth, the transfer occurs from one party to another. I assume that either of the parties may be an 
individual, a group of individuals (e.g. a household) or a corporate body. We may therefore regard, 
for example, a transfer from an individual to a charity as a gift, and a transfer from a charity to an 
individual. By contrast, Caillé’s general definition leaves out parties as well as transfers. It thus leaves 
out something essential to our understanding of the gift: on his definition, even cycling down the 
road would count as a gift, irrespective of whether some other party benefitted from the action, 
although I assume  that this is an inadvertent slip on Caillé’s part. 
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Fifth, there is no requirement for a compulsory transfer in return. Much of the literature on the gift 
concerns reciprocity, and although I have argued strongly that reciprocity is not a defining feature of 
the gift, it is clear that some gifts are reciprocated, and that reciprocation is an important feature of 
some gift practices. If I give you a birthday present, it is entirely possible that you will later give one 
to me, and the fact that I gave you one may influence you to reciprocate, but the original gift does 
not create a binding requirement to do so. By the time my birthday comes around, we may have 
drifted apart, or you may be too poor to buy me a gift, or too ill to buy me a gift, or just too mean to 
buy me a gift, and there is no sanction that compels you to do so. In Testart’s terms, the return is not 
obligatory.   
Gifts can therefore be contrasted with commodity transactions, since in such transactions a transfer 
from one party to another creates a legal obligation for the second party to make a transfer in the 
reverse direction. The crucial issue is the obligatory requirement to make a return, and not the 
question of whether a return actually occurs. When we give a gift, a return may occur, but there is 
no binding requirement that it must. When we buy a commodity, we immediately generate a legal 
requirement to pay for it, even if that payment is itself deferred. In this respect, gifts and 
commodities are diametrically opposed. Once again my argument converges with Testart’s: if we 
obscure this distinction by insisting that the gift incurs an obligation to reciprocate “we blur all the 
difference between gift and exchange” (Testart, 1998, p. 104). 
Such oppositions are often features of definitions, but must be treated carefully: we cannot define 
all the features of the gift by contrast with the commodity, since they also have some features in 
common. Both, for example, involve a transfer of goods or services from one party to another. These 
similarities create the possibility of cases that have some of the characteristics of both gifts and 
commodities: hybrid borderline cases. Consider the case of buying a lottery ticket. In many European 
countries one condition of licensing a lottery is that part of the proceeds must be disbursed to 
charitable causes, so that buying a lottery ticket has something of the character of making a 
charitable donation. If a fixed percentage of the price paid for a lottery ticket is donated to charity, is 
the purchaser of a lottery ticket buying a commodity or making a gift? On the one hand, they are 
engaged in a monetary exchange, in which monetary payment is legally required for the ticket, and 
so in this sense this is a commodity. On the other hand, they are doing so in the knowledge that a 
portion of the price is a donation to charity. It is possible to argue that the purchase is both a 
commodity transaction and (in part) a gift, at one and the same time: a hybrid of two types. We 
should not define the gift so strictly as to exclude the possibility of such hybrids. 
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One feature of cases like this is that it may be difficult to decide whether a transfer is a gift or a 
commodity, or both or indeed neither. Consider the case of New York nightclub owners who give 
models free entry, free drinks, and free meals at their nightclubs (McClain & Mears, 2012). These are 
gifts, in that the models strictly speaking are required to do nothing in return. But inherent in the act 
of this acceptance, the models deliver a benefit to the nightclubs: their presence at the venue tends 
to attract high-paying customers. Does that also impart something of the character of a commodity 
to these benefits? One could make a case that these transfers are neither gift nor commodity but 
something in between or perhaps a mix of both.  
Finally, if we confine our attention to what is said in a definition, we will miss one last essential 
feature of all definitions: that which is absent from them, that which is left out. Sometimes 
distinctions may be left out by accident, sometimes they may be left out because the author has not 
considered cases that would make clear the need for a certain distinction, but sometimes 
distinctions may be left out deliberately, and mine includes at least one deliberate omission: it does 
not say that a gift cannot benefit the donor. Those who give may receive praise, their social status 
may rise, they may gain pleasure from helping others, and they may even receive material benefits 
as a consequence of their giving, such as open source programmers who give their labour freely to 
programming projects but as a result acquire expertise that might open the door to lucrative 
consulting careers (Lerner & Tirole, 2002, pp. 213, 217–220). They may even be motivated by the 
desire for such benefits, for example unpaid interns who give their labour in order to build their CVs 
and their career prospects. But none of this prevents the transfers they make from being gifts. It is 
only when a benefit is a return from the recipient that is required as a consequence of the original 
transfer that the transfer is not a gift, as I have defined it. I have thus ignored extensive discussion in 
the giving literature on the question of the disinterestedness of the gift, or the question of altruism. 
Hence there is no moral element to these definitions: giving may often be generous, but it is not 
generous by definition. Indeed, gifts may even be given in the pursuit of commercial gain (Barnett, 
2018; Elder-Vass, 2016, Chapter 8). A comprehensive study of the gift will surely include the ethical 
evaluation of giving institutions but this is a different matter than the question of how to define the 
gift.  
5. Conclusion 
Giving and the gift are lay terms that refer polysemically, but quite unambiguously, to the practice of 
voluntarily transferring goods or services to another party without any compulsory requirement for a 
transfer in return. For the purposes of theories of giving, we need to define these terms 
explicatively: by basing their meanings on the widely accepted lay senses while excluding polysemes 
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and making some small adjustments to common usage to secure coherence between the two terms. 
Once we have done so it is apparent that many of the definitions of the gift offered in the literature 
are defective, and as a consequence some of the claims made about gifts are false. These problems 
are largely a result of extending arguments from Mauss’s work about phenomena in non-modern 
societies that, in many cases, are not gifts at all. These phenomena may be interesting and 
important, and they may even have implications for our understanding of the modern world, but it 
creates confusion to call them gifts and to generalise from them to modern cases.  
This is not to say that a more adequate definition of giving licences an alternative universal theory of 
the gift. The definition developed in this paper still encompasses a wide range of different kinds of 
giving institutions with different features and implications. And although the meaning of giving can 
be specified quite clearly, there remain many grey areas, many cases which lie on the borderline of 
that meaning. The consideration of such cases allows us to refine our understanding both of the core 
concept of the gift and of its diverse relations with neighbouring institutions such as loans and 
commodity exchange. Such work is crucial if we are to move beyond the obsession of economics 
with market systems and provide useful analysis of the economic forms based on giving that are 
central to provisioning economies and thus to some of the most important alternatives to the 
market economy (cf Benkler, 2006; Elder-Vass, 2016). 
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